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All evidence introduced in court must meet some threshold standard in 
order to be admitted.  Even the lowliest of proof must pass a relevancy test.  
In the context of expert evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the 
precise threshold that must be met remains in considerable doubt, even 
nearly twenty-five years after the Supreme Court sought to clarify the 
standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1  The single-most 
important principle announced in Daubert was that some measure of 
scientific realism should guide trial court admissibility decisions.  In the case 
of scientific evidence, for instance, “scientific knowledge” and “scientific 
validity” were the prescribed guidelines.2  But in respect to all expert 
evidence, trial courts were required to evaluate the underlying bases for the 
proffered expert opinion to assess whether it was adequately valid and 
 
* David Faigman, Chancellor & Dean and John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law at 
the University of California, Hastings College of the Law and Professor at the University of 
California, San Francisco, School of Medicine.  Jennifer Mnookin, Dean and David G. Price 
and Dallas P. Price Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law. Many thanks to Jodi Kruger 
and her fellow UCLA librarians for very helpful support and assistance.   
 1  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Daubert, decided in 1993, 
is often used as shorthand for the current Rule 702, which was amended in 2000 largely to 
codify the standard set forth in that case.  Hence, the applicable rule is 702, but the Daubert 
decision continues to be cited for having set minimum expectations for the quality of expert 
opinion evidence offered in court.  
 2  Id. at 589–92.  
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reliable.3  For all expert opinions, the trial court was to be the gatekeeper to 
ensure that there were “good grounds” for an expert’s proffered evidence.4 
But this threshold gatekeeping requirement, though now well-
ensconced, continues to raise as many questions as it answers.  How high 
should the threshold be?  Just how much scientific support must ground an 
expert’s opinion to warrant admissibility?  How should a court assess 
whether experts know what they think they know?  And, moreover, how 
should courts go about determining whether the expert’s knowledge is based 
on sufficiently good grounds to be admitted?  These questions have 
particular salience when experts wish to testify to scientifically plausible but 
weakly supported claims.  Furthermore, in many product liability and toxic 
torts cases, admissibility decisions about the expert’s testimony may well be 
case-dispositive: admit the expert evidence, and the case—often involving a 
tragic set of facts—comes before the jury, but exclude that evidence, and 
summary judgment is a foregone conclusion because no admissible evidence 
supports causation.  When causation is possible but scientifically unproven, 
how should the courts respond?  If courts take seriously Daubert’s holding 
that courts should employ scientific sensibilities to evaluate expert opinion 
evidence, exclusion and summary judgment are doctrinally required when 
adequate scientific support does not establish causation.  But when 
tantalizing glimmers of evidence suggest that causation is possible, albeit far 
from scientifically established, some courts respond by resisting, or 
stretching, Daubert’s strictures.  In this Article, we consider the curious case 
of Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline, a Ninth Circuit decision that fails so 
dramatically to employ scientific reasoning that it serves well as a cautionary 
tale. 
Wendell also illustrates how, when courts are making admissibility 
decision under conditions of scientific uncertainty, their reasoning matters 
as much as the conclusion.  To put the point starkly: the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Wendell is indefensible, but its conclusion might not be – at 
least if it had been making an admissibility judgment in the first instance, 
rather than on appeal. On appeal, however, we see little justification for 
overturning the trial court’s judgment, given the paucity of scientific 
evidence to support causation and the appropriate standard of review – and 
certainly, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on this score is not persuasive. 
When we began writing this Article, the Supreme Court had yet to 
decide whether to review the Ninth Circuit’s holding.  Ultimately, the Court 
did not grant cert.5  Nonetheless, we expect that the Court will need to engage 
 
 3  Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).  
 4  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90.  
 5  The case, renamed Teva Parmaceuticals, Inc. v. Wendell, has been scheduled for 
conference for March 16, 2018.  See SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 19, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.c
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further with questions about the application of Rule 702 and Daubert to the 
many thorny issues of causation in toxic tort cases.  In what follows, we 
therefore use Wendell as a case study and an object lesson, but the important 
issues raised by this case about how to –and how not to – assess causation in 
toxic torts cases have implications well beyond this  particular instance and 
example. 
II. CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER 
Like many such cases, the underlying story of Wendell is 
heartbreakingly tragic.  Maxx Wendell died at the age of twenty-one of 
Hepatosplenic T-cell lymphoma (HSTCL), a very rare and aggressive 
cancer.  Prior to developing HSTCL, Maxx was treated with a variety of 
drugs for inflammatory bowel disease (IBD), including in particular, 
mercaptopurine (6-MP). Maxx’s parents sued the manufacturers of these 
drugs, claiming that 6-MP interacted with another drug, the tumor necrosis 
factor alpha antagonist (anti-TNF), to cause Maxx’s HSTCL. 
Two highly qualified physicians “opined in their expert reports that the 
combination of 6-MP drugs and anti-TNF drugs prescribed to Maxx 
increased his likelihood of developing HSTCL and, ultimately, caused his 
death.”6  But the district court found that these opinions “are not based on 
sufficiently reliable scientific data,” and hence, could not be admissible 
under Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert.  The district court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs had 
“failed to present sufficient evidence to support an inference that [6-MP], 
either alone or in combination with anti-TNF drugs, caused Maxx to develop 
HSTCL.”7  There was no dispute about whether the experts were qualified 
or whether their opinions were relevant.  But the district court appropriately 
recognized that the key evidentiary question was neither of these, but rather, 
whether the experts’ opinions themselves were adequately reliable. 
The district court had little difficulty answering that question in the 
negative.  As the judge explained, plaintiffs’ experts conceded that there 
were neither animal studies nor any epidemiological studies indicating the 
relationship between 6-MP and anti-TNF drugs and the development of 
HSTCL.  Moreover, the experts acknowledged that they did not employ the 
same level of rigor in forming their expert testimony that they would use for 
reaching similar determinations directed at other scientists rather than the 
court, through publication in peer-reviewed journals rather than testimony.  
 
om/case-files/cases/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-wendell/.  
 6  Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 09-cv-04124, 2014 WL 2943572, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
June 30, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 
2017).   
 7  Id. at *7.  
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For instance, when one expert “was asked whether his opinions in this case 
would be publishable in a medical article, he replied that the standard for 
publication would ‘probably be more rigorous’ than the standard he applied 
in forming his opinions.”8  In addition, more than seventy percent of HSTCL 
cases, according to the experts, are idiopathic, meaning that the cause is 
unknown.  This, the trial judge correctly realized, makes it impossible to 
determine cause reliably simply by making use of a differential etiology 
method, whereby other known causes are eliminated;9 if the main cause is 
“unknown,” eliminating other known causes establishes little, absent “some 
reliable evidence of a positive link between the drugs at issue and the 
disease.”10  To be sure, some case reports and incident studies the experts 
relied upon described other examples of HSTCL—acknowledged to be an 
extremely rare cancer—among other patients who also had taken a 
combination of 6-MP and anti-TNF drugs (though not necessarily the precise 
same drugs as Maxx).  But for the trial court, these reports amounted to 
suggestive anecdotes, not scientific proof—nor, according to the court, had 
the physicians eliminated IBD itself as a potential cause of Maxx’s cancer. 
Up to this point, the story is familiar.  The plaintiffs’ experts relied on 
a generalized clinical judgment, informed largely by anecdote and 
conjecture, perhaps plausible, but insufficiently proven.  While the experts 
were willing to testify to a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” about 
cause, even they acknowledged their causal conjecture didn’t rise to the 
standards of peer review in a scientific journal.  Since the law requires that 
the underlying basis for the experts’ opinion be adequately supported by 
“scientific knowledge,” the trial court excluded their testimony.  Once their 
experts’ opinions were excluded, the plaintiffs lacked sufficient—or indeed 
any—admissible evidence of causation, so the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion was, naturally, granted.  Additionally, given the holding in 
General Electric Company v. Joiner,11 which mandates an abuse of 
discretion standard for the appellate review of trial courts’ admissibility 
decisions involving expert evidence, the appellate outcome appeared well-
determined. In light of Daubert and Rule 702’s insistence that scientific 
opinions in court require an adequate scientific basis, how could a trial judge 
who excludes expert opinions based solely on clinical judgment, case 
reports, and conjecture (and without animal studies, epidemiological studies, 
or a persuasive differential etiology) be seen to have abused his discretion? 
 
 
 8  Id. at *4.   
 9  See infra notes 22–23 for a more complete discussion of the methods associated with 
“differential etiology.”   
 10  Wendell, 2014 WL 2943572, at *5.   
 11  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).  
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At the Ninth Circuit, however, is where the case gets “curiouser and 
curiouser.”12  The appellate court at least nominally accepted that its review 
was limited to the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.13  But the 
court went on to warn that it reviews de novo the “construction or 
interpretation of . . . the Federal Rules of Evidence, including whether 
particular evidence falls within the scope of a given rule.”14 
Unfortunately, the appellate court never returned to the question of 
what standard of review it employed to overturn the trial court’s decision, 
nor precisely what it meant by its statement that it had the power to review 
de novo “whether particular evidence falls within the scope of a given rule.”  
On its face, of course, the testimony of the plaintiffs’ two experts 
unambiguously fell within the scope of Rule 702.  Thus, the lower court’s 
finding that the evidence here—i.e., expert medical causation evidence—
was subject to Rule 702 was plainly not error.  While the appropriate scope 
of Rule 702 could indeed be a legal question warranting de novo review, that 
hardly seems applicable to these facts; there was no plausible argument that 
Rule 702 did not apply to the causation evidence proffered by the plaintiffs’ 
experts.  A more ambitious reading of the appellate court’s assertion—that 
is, that all admissibility decisions regarding whether expert evidence is 
admissible “within the scope of the rule” is subject to de novo review—
would effectively nullify the Joiner ruling, and the court did not seem to 
mean to go that far with its oblique sentence gesturing to some possible, not 
fully specified, role for a de novo standard. 
In any event, while the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions largely used the 
rhetorical register of “abuse of discretion,” both its reasoning and its 
conclusions are hard to justify under that deferential standard. The court 
concludes that while it is a “close question,” the district court “erred” and 
“abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Shustov’s and Dr. Weisenburger’s 
testimony. . . .”15  Even if formally engaged in an abuse of discretion 
analysis, the court did not seem to show the kinds of deference to the district 
court that the standard would typically invite. 
Why did the Ninth Circuit reach the opposite conclusion from the trial 
court?  Without question, the plaintiffs’ experts were two highly qualified 
and well-regarded physicians.16  This fact turned out to be the primary basis 
for the appellate court’s belief that the lower court had erred.  The court 
 
 12  LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS 16 (Lothrop Publishing Co., 1898) (1865). 
 13  Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 14  Id. at 1231 (alteration in original) (quoting Messick v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 747 
F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 15  Id. at 1233, 1237.  
 16  Id. at 1233.  
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summarized its view of the proffered expert evidence as follows: 
 
“[M]edicine partakes of art as well as science.”  Where, as here, 
two doctors who stand at or near the top of their field and have 
extensive clinical experience with the rare disease or class of 
disease at issue, are prepared to give expert opinions supporting 
causation, we conclude that Daubert poses no bar based on their 
principles and methodology.17 
 
This remarkable paragraph deserves to be dissected and examined in at 
least three parts.  The first involves the court’s broad-brush assertion 
regarding medicine partaking of art as well as science.  The second is the 
outsized role qualifications played in the court’s assessment.  And the third 
concerns the relationship, if any, between extensive clinical experience and 
determining medical causation. 
III. EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
A. Scientific Evidence That is Based on Art, Not Science 
Whenever someone asserts that “[m]edicine partakes of art as well as 
science,” we can suspect that science, at least in this instance, is likely being 
tossed to the wind. It is not that the claim is wrong – the practice of medicine 
is indeed both an art and a science; but a claim of scientific causation ought 
to be grounded in valid scientific knowledge and based on reasoned 
explanations that go beyond medicine as an ‘art.’  The court itself noted 
earlier in its opinion that “[s]cientific evidence is reliable ‘if the principles 
and methodology used by an expert are grounded in the methods of 
science.’”18  The question presented in Wendell was straightforward, even if 
the answer was anything but.  Specifically, the key question was whether or 
not the defendant’s drug was  substantial cause of Maxx’s illness.  While 
medical treatment may indeed have artistry associated with it, where the art 
lies in determining whether adequate scientific support establishes that A 
causes B is far less obvious; and the Ninth Circuit, in any case, did not 
explain it. Furthermore, Daubert and its progeny stand for the idea that 
expert evidence requires more than “ipse dixit” to be admissible—hunches, 





 17  Id. at 1237 (quoting Messick, 747 F.3d at 1198).   
 18  Id. at 1232 (quoting Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 
2003)).   
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Of course, there are times when experience—what the Ninth Circuit 
likely meant by “art”—should be a basis for, and possibly even a sufficient 
basis for, admitting expert evidence.  The difficulty lies in determining when 
this is so.  Courts regularly admit all sorts of experts based on their 
experience with a subject area, from auto mechanics to real estate appraisers.  
These disciplines neither hold themselves out to be scientific, nor do their 
fields regularly employ scientific methods to test their hypotheses.  
Nonetheless, common sense recognizes that some fields, and some experts, 
have relevant and reliable knowledge to impart to judicial proceedings based 
on their long experience with the subject.  The classic example of this is the 
harbor pilot who has maneuvered a particular waterway hundreds of times 
and is called upon to provide an expert opinion, say, about the dangers of a 
sandbar to local shipping.  In such cases, experience will indeed provide 
useful expertise that ordinarily will meet the strictures of Rule 702.19 
At the same time, the courts have a long and troubled history of 
permitting experienced-based expert testimony in cases that are ostensibly 
based on scientific techniques, but which have not been validated beyond the 
everyday experience of the so-called experts.  Most notoriously, this has 
occurred, and continues to occur, in courts’ reception of forensic science.20  
Historically, many forensic specialties were admitted based on experience 
but, when later tested by standard methods of science, turned out to be deeply 
flawed, often overstated, and sometimes wholly invalid.  Some areas no 
longer admitted in court include microscopic hair identification analysis, 
bullet-lead comparison, and certain claims made by arson investigators.  
Other forensic areas of doubtful scientific value, but with experiential claims 
of reliability, include bitemark identification evidence and some additional 




 19  For efforts to consider and taxonomize the functions of expertise and its use as 
evidence, and to identify distinct admissibility challenges posed by different kinds of 
evidence, see, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of 
Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508 (2000); Samuel R. Gross 
& Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141 (2003); David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher 
Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 417 (2014)  
 20  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncj
rs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.   
 21  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 8 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/file
s/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.   
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Ultimately, experience only has value as a basis for grounding expert 
claims when there is a feedback loop that allows the expert to learn whether 
his or her experience is accurate.  Hence, the harbor pilot’s knowledge of 
obstructions is likely borne from actual feedback regarding their existence 
and danger, either from personal experience or the direct experience of his 
or her colleagues.  In comparison, a forensic science such as hair 
identification analysis does not typically give the examiner any feedback on 
the accuracy of the exam.  Such experts might learn that the defendant whose 
hair they examined was convicted or acquitted, but this provides at best 
limited information about the value or accuracy of their identification 
methods.  Indeed, as we have seen with the long tenure that many claims 
based on experience have had, from blood-letting in medicine to bitemark 
identification in the law, self-described experts often remain convinced of 
the value of their expertise even in the face of contrary research data. 
To be sure, in the case of medicine, art might indeed play something of 
a role in the treatment knowledge that doctors develop.  After all, if a doctor 
has treated a certain illness numerous times, he or she is likely to learn what 
seems to work and what has not worked with similarly situated patients.  For 
the most part—though not invariably—doctors receive feedback about the 
outcomes of their therapy.  If the patient gets better, a doctor is likely to try 
the same treatment with the next similarly situated patient.  Over time, 
continued success—or failure—with a treatment regimen will give the 
physician considerable useful, albeit informal, data on its utility.  Yet, even 
on the treatment side of medicine, many doctors hold fast to treatments for a 
very long time that, ultimately, are demonstrated to be ineffective through 
careful research.22  Nonetheless, in regard to treatment outcomes, doctors are 
more like harbor pilots than hair identification analysts. 
However, in Wendell, the question presented was not a treatment issue, 
nor a matter of diagnosis; it was a question of causation.  On this question, 
doctors are unlikely to receive such direct feedback on their conjectures 
about what caused a particular illness.  Feedback loops are frequently non-
existent, or at least weaker, when physicians are assessing questions of 
medical causation.23  Indeed, case law is replete with examples of speculative 
 
 22  See, e.g., David Epstein, When Evidence Says No, But Doctors Say Yes, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/02/when-evidence-says-
no-but-doctors-say-yes/517368/ (arguing that although stents for stable patients provide no 
benefits, “hundreds of thousands of stable patients receive stents annually . . .”).  See also 
Vinay Prasad et al., A Decade of Reversal: An Analysis of 146 Contradicted Medical 
Practices, 88 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 790 (Aug. 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2013
.05.012 (finding that 146 of 363 current medical practices are ineffective).   
 23  To be sure, in some instances, physicians may have solid ways to test their theories of 
causation.  If the physician’s theory of cause is something testable—an allergen, or an 
exposure to something in the environment that can be controlled or tested, the physician may 
indeed receive feedback about what happens to the patient when that allergen is avoided.  But 
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medical beliefs about causation that resulted in litigation only to turn out not 
to be valid when adequately researched.  Bendectin, the subject of Daubert 
itself, and silicone implants, which generated hundreds of thousands of 
lawsuits, are two particularly prominent examples.24  On issues of medical 
causation, then, medical doctors are more like hair identification analysts.  
They certainly might speculate about the causes of the illnesses that they 
treat, but the best—and only scientifically valid—answers to those questions 
will come from the research literature.  And, ordinarily, this will involve 
some combination of toxicological and epidemiological studies. 
B. Relying on Qualifications Alone 
The fact that the Ninth Circuit was impressed with the qualifications of 
the two experts has marginal value to the review of the lower court’s 
admissibility decision.  The lower court also found plaintiffs’ experts to be 
well-qualified clinicians.  The issue was not whether they were impressive 
doctors; rather, it was the adequacy of the basis for their opinions regarding 
causation that the district court found wanting. In this respect, the Ninth 
Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the role of qualifications in the 
assessment of expert testimony.  Rule 702, of course, requires that experts 
be qualified in their respective areas of expertise before being allowed to 
testify.  But this is a necessary, not a sufficient, requirement. In fact, in the 
rule itself, qualifications operate as a prologue to the rule’s substantial 
additional requirements: “a witness who is  qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill experience, training or education may testify. . . if” (and, 
implicitly, only if) the evidence is: (a) helpful to the trier of fact; (b) based 
on sufficient facts and data; (c) the result of reliable principles and methods; 
and (d) reliably applied in this instance.25  A surprising number of courts, 
however, appear to share the Ninth Circuit’s overvaluing of this preliminary 
requirement.26 
 
for many diseases, the doctor will have no way to test a theory about cause at the level of the 
individual patient.   
 24  JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL; A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION (1998); 
MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The 
Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000); MARCIA ANGELL: SCIENCE 
ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT Case 
(1997). 
 25  FED. R. EVID. 702.   
 26  See, e.g., Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng’g, Inc., 731 F.3d 1171, 1185 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 
2003)) (“Although an expert’s qualifications go primarily to the first prong of Daubert’s 
inquiry, ‘an expert’s overwhelming qualifications may bear on the reliability of his proffered 
testimony’ even if ‘they are by no means a guarantor of reliability.’”).  See generally Graves 
v. Mazda Motor Corp., 405 F. App’x 296 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he ipse dixit of an expert, no 
matter how qualified he may be, is never enough to guarantee him a ticket to admissibility.”); 
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Beyond the plain meaning of Rule 702, there are many reasons why 
courts should not rest admissibility decisions on qualifications alone.  
Foremost, perhaps, is the significant danger, especially acute in our 
adversarial system, that even the most qualified professionals may be 
tempted to propound opinions that go beyond what sound science can 
support.  The adversarial process already leads to the selection of party 
experts that are likely to be at the tails of scientific opinion27 and case 
demands likely further prod experts to more categorical or extreme 
statements than they might otherwise maintain among their professional 
colleagues.  Indeed, with all due respect to the plaintiffs’ experts in Wendell, 
this is exactly what may have happened in that case.  At least one of the 
experts explicitly conceded that his opinion “to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty” for courtroom purposes would not meet the standards 
used for peer review and publication in science.  Courts need to ensure that 
otherwise qualified experts stay within their expertise when testifying, 
particularly given the pressures of partisanship that may invite, consciously 
or not, overstatements that assist the party paying for their testimony.28 
Additionally, the entire notion of “qualifications” is a profession-
specific classification.29  A world-renowned oncologist might be extremely 
“well-qualified” as a treating physician but have scant expertise in 
identifying the causes of cancer.  A DNA technician might be well qualified 
to perform the rote protocol of PCR testing, but lack expertise in 
understanding molecular biology and thus what the empirical basis for the 
test itself is.  And a fingerprint expert might know how to apply the standard 
approach to identification—known as ACE-V30—but have no understanding 
of its validity or lack thereof.  A witness “qualified” in his or her field might, 
 
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY, JOSEPH 
SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE 
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:12 (2017–2018 ed. 2017).  
 27  See Jonah B. Gelbach, Expert Mining and Required Disclosure, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
131, 131 (2014) (describing “expert mining” as the practice, by “resourceful attorneys” of 
“hiring multiple experts, asking each to provide an expert report on the same issue, and then 
put[ting] on the stand only the one who provides the most favorable report”).   
 28  For an effort to develop institutional tools to combat this set of structural dilemmas, 
see JuriLytics, founded by David Faigman, one of this Article’s authors.  For the history of 
expert evidence showing how partisanship has been an extremely longstanding (and hard to 
combat) concern, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An 
Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763 (2007).  
 29  See RG Steel Sparrows Point, LLC v. Kinder Morgan Bulk Terminals, Inc., 609 F. 
App’x 731, 738 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The question of whether a witness is qualified to testify is 
context-driven and can only be determined by the nature of the opinion he offers.”).  
 30  ACE-V stands for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, Verification.  
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or might not, be “qualified” to testify on the specific issue in dispute at trial.  
In short, there is always a question of fit between an expert’s professional 
qualifications and whether he or she is qualified to provide the testimony 
offered in court. 
C. What is the “Task at Hand” in Medical Causation Testimony? 
A fundamental flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s review was its equating 
expertise in treating a disease with expertise in identifying the cause of that 
disease.31  These are substantially different skillsets and there is little basis 
for believing that clinical skill equates to scientific acumen.  To be sure, 
some clinicians may also be accomplished research scientists, or at least 
competent interpreters of a research literature, but the fact that the Venn 
diagrams may well overlap does not mean that a qualified clinician should 
necessarily be permitted to testify about causation.  Indeed, when the Ninth 
Circuit turned to the question of causation, it offered up both non sequiturs 
and inadequately supported conclusions. 
Ordinarily, as the district court recognized, medical causation contains 
two separate levels of analysis, what is often referred to as general causation 
and specific causation.  The former involves whether scientific support exists 
for the proposition that a particular drug or substance causes a particular 
illness; and the latter involves whether there is support for the proposition 
that a particular drug or substance caused the particular instance of that 
illness at issue in the case.  General causation is a prerequisite to specific 
causation, since, if there is no proof that the drug or substance can cause the 
illness, then there can be no proof that it did cause the illness in a particular 
case. 
Unfortunately, in Wendell, the Ninth Circuit did little more than restate 
the conclusory assertions of the plaintiffs’ experts, making no serious effort 
to evaluate their accuracy or basis.  For example, Dr. Shustov, one of the 
plaintiffs’ two experts, said he relied “on medical records as well as [his] 
education, training and experience, knowledge of the pertinent medical 
literature and [his] knowledge of the epidemiology, diagnosis and natural 
history of HSTCL.”32  He said that he “pulled the facts out of the literature,” 
which indicated “an increased risk of HSTCL in patients taking 6-MP over 
the general population.”33  Presumably, all of this was offered as a basis for 
a finding of general causation. 
However, the Ninth Circuit did not provide any significant analysis of 
this literature, which, as the experts themselves conceded, lacked any 
 
 31  See Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1233–34 (2017).  
 32  Id. at 1234.   
 33  Id.   
FAIGMANMNOOKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2018  4:46 PM 
618 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:607 
toxicological or epidemiological studies.  From what the Ninth Circuit 
discusses in the four corners of its opinion, it is challenging to understand 
what to make of the claim of an “increased risk” in this context, since they 
described no effort to control for confounding variables.  Such statements 
are reminiscent of the spurious causal connection between the amount of ice 
cream consumed at a beach and the number of drownings; they are, of 
course, associated, but ice cream consumption in no way causes drownings: 
they are linked by a third variable, the number of beachgoers, and perhaps 
also by a fourth, the warmth of the day, which likely affects both how many 
beachgoers take to the water and how many go for the ice cream. This 
example, and Dr. Shustov’s opinion, both risk the elementary error of 
assuming that correlation demonstrates causation.  The Ninth Circuit offered 
no analysis to establish that Dr. Shustov’s opinion was anything more than 
superficially plausible conjecture and speculation, grounded in anecdote, and 
dressed up in the garb of scientific jargon.  Dr. Shustov claimed that, “[a]fter 
reviewing the literature, he ‘compiled the numbers about frequency of 
diseases, about frequency of inflammatory bowel disease and [he] looked at 
the biological causation of lymphoma pertaining to this case.’”34  But what 
does this last sentence even mean without further explication?  The Ninth 
Circuit made no attempt to explain it. 
After apparently reaching a conclusion about the general causation 
between 6-MP and HSTCL, Dr. Shustov went on to offer an opinion on 
specific causation.  In medical causation cases, this is typically achieved 
through a method best described as “differential etiology.”  This form of 
analysis requires first ruling in the putative cause (here 6-MP) as possible 
and then ruling out other possible causes as inapplicable to the facts.  This 
notion of differential etiology is sometimes confused with a similar worded 
method called “differential diagnosis.”  Differential diagnosis is a method 
for identifying what illness a person suffers from; differential etiology, in 
contrast, is a method for determining what caused that illness.  The two 
sound similar, but require very different knowledge bases and skillsets. 
According to Dr. Shustov, however, the two are essentially the same.  
He said that “he performs differential diagnosis in attempting to diagnose 
every patient, and that he has applied the same technique to determine the 
cause of a disease.”35  According to the court, his differential [etiology] 
“assumes the pertinence of all potential causes, then rules out the ones as to 
which there is no plausible evidence of causation, and then determines the 
most likely cause among those that cannot be excluded.”36  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 34  Id.  
 35  Id.  
 36  Id.  
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found this to be “scientifically sound.”37  But given that there was insufficient 
proof of general causation, and that over 70% of HSTCL cases are 
idiopathic—that is to say, without known cause—the soundness of this 
differential analysis is far from obvious.  The court summarized Dr. 
Shustov’s reasoning regarding his conclusion on the cause of Maxx’s illness 
as follows: 
 
Dr. Shustov stated that there was a one in six million chance that 
Maxx would have developed HSTCL without being exposed to 6-
MP.  In light of those odds, Dr. Shustov stated that “based on [his] 
experience in T-cell lymphomas, knowledge of the literature and 
being involved in T-cell lymphoma research in the past ten years” 
he determined “that it’s much more likely that exposure to 
mutagen and immunosuppressants caused the lymphoma.”38 
 
The scientific logic of this analysis is, at a minimum, inadequately 
specified, and may well be far from sound.  Ultimately, the court returned to 
the qualifications of the two experts, once again conflating their medical 
credentials with the soundness of their testimony.  The court asserted, 
“[n]othing in Daubert, or its progeny, properly understood, suggests that the 
most experienced and credentialed doctors in a given field should be barred 
from testifying based on a differential diagnosis.”39  But, in fact, everything 
in Daubert and its progeny suggests that “the most experienced and 
credentialed doctors in a given field should be barred from testifying” if their 
differential diagnosis is not sufficiently scientifically valid.40 
In addition to its emphasis on credentials as justifying the legitimacy of 
the experts’ conclusions, the appellate court seemed to think, more generally, 
that the district court’s approach to evaluating the experts was too formalistic 
and cramped. The Ninth Circuit wrote, 
 
The district court looked too narrowly at each individual 
consideration, without taking into account the broader picture of 
the experts’ overall methodology.  It improperly ignored the 
experts’ experience, reliance on a variety of literature and studies, 
and review of Maxx’s medical records and history, as well as the 
fundamental importance of differential diagnosis by experienced 
doctors treating troubled patients.  The district court also 
overemphasized the facts that (1) the experts did not develop their 
opinions based on independent research and (2) the experts did not 
 
 37  See Wendell, 858 F.3d at 1234.  
 38  Id.   
 39  Id. at 1235.   
 40  Id.   
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cite epidemiological studies. We hold that all together, these 
mistakes warrant reversal.41 
 
The appellate court is asserting, in essence, that the district court’s 
analysis was excessively atomistic, “look[ing] too narrowly at each 
individual consideration” rather than “the broader picture. . . .”42  On this 
point, the Ninth Circuit’s admonition is correct in theory but deeply 
problematic in application. 
It is true that some courts have been excessively atomistic in their 
analysis of expert claims.  Excessive atomism risks making two errors, one 
evidentiary and the other scientific.43  As a matter of evidence law, “a brick 
is not a wall”—that is, proof of a necessary element can be made up of many 
distinct bricks, and no individual item of evidence must prove the point 
alone.  From an evidentiary perspective, there is nothing inappropriate about 
establishing causation by aggregating multiple items of evidence, no one of 
which establishes causation alone.  And scientists, too, can and do aggregate 
multiple discrete and disparate items of evidence to reach a conclusion. Some 
scientific aggregation methods may be formal and methodologically 
rigorous, like structured meta-analyses, while others may be more informal 
or the product of collective engagements by experts, like the Cochrane 
reviews, or government consensus panels, or assessing general causation by 
using the Bradford Hill guidelines.44  When aggregation is legitimate, and 
when it may become an excuse for insufficiently justified expert conclusions 
based on “soi-disant” expertise and hand-waving is not simple to answer.  It 
depends, both, on the details of the underlying evidentiary support for a given 
claim, as well as the specific question being asked.  This focus on whether 
the scientific basis supports the particular, concrete testimony offered in 
court was referred to as the “task at hand” in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, the 
third case in the Daubert trilogy, and is an important concept defined and 
 
 41  Id. at 1233.   
 42  Id.   
 43  Jennifer L. Mnookin, Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 1524, 1576–80 (2013).   
 44  See generally Lawrence Cetrulo, Evaluating the Totality of the Evidence: The 
Bradford Hill Criteria, in 3 TOXIC TORTS LITIG. GUIDE § 22:5 (2017); Kirsten Bell, Cochrane 
Reviews and the Behavioural Turn in Evidence-Based Medicine, 21 HEALTH SOC. REV. 313 
(2012); David C. Currow & Irene J. Higginson, Cochrane Reviews: Four Proposals for 
Improvement, 18 J. PALLIATIVE MED. (2015) 906–07; Matthew J. Gabel & Charles R. Shipan, 
A Social Choice Approach to Expert Consensus Panels, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 543–64 (2004); 
Dr. Frank C. Woodside and Allison G. Davis, The Bradford Hill Criteria: The Forgotten 
Predicate, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 103 (2013); P.M. Wortman, Consensus Panels: 
Methodology, INT’L ENCY. SOC. BEHAV. SCI. 2609–13 (2001); COCHRANE HANDBOOK FOR 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS OF INTERVENTIONS (Julian P.T. Higgins & Sally Green eds. 2011), 
http://handbook-5-1.cochrane.org/.   
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refined brilliantly by Professor Michael Risinger in his scholarship.45 
At one extreme, there is a danger of courts applying Daubert too 
rigidly, piece by piece, and looking too narrowly at each item of evidence—
perhaps even insisting upon a single “smoking gun” piece of causation 
evidence, like a precisely on point epidemiological study showing a 
substantially heightened relative risk, as a necessary precondition to proving 
cause.  An excessively atomistic judicial analysis pulls apart each item of 
evidence, dismissing each strand, study, or claim as inadequately 
establishing what needs to be proven, providing inadequate opportunity to 
assess whether the evidence, taken in its entirety, makes the case that the 
“weight of the evidence” establishes causation by a preponderance.46 
But in this case, the Ninth Circuit teeters distressingly far in the other 
direction.  The opinion’s analysis emphasizes—about a number of issues and 
concerns—that each is not necessary for evidence to be admissible under 
Daubert and Rule 702.47  On each of these points taken individually, the 
Ninth Circuit is correct.  But in aggregate, it errs, particularly given the 
alleged application of Joiner’s abuse of discretion standard, by failing to 
recognize that while any given limitation might not be fatal, to have so many 
strongly suggests that there are not adequate scientific grounds that support 
the opinion, or at a minimum, that the district court’s determination was 
squarely within the bounds of reasoned discretion. 
For example, as the court correctly notes, it ought not necessarily to be 
fatal that an expert’s opinion does not derive from independent research.48 
While opinions derived specifically for court escalate the danger of 
partisanship, often questions come to the fore as a result of litigation and so 
the fact that experts developed their opinions in that posture ought not, by 
itself, preclude admissibility.49  Similarly, epidemiological studies, while 
enormously helpful, ought not to be a sine qua non, particularly because for 
 
 45  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); D. Michael Risinger, 
Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000).   
 46  The legitimacy of “weight of the evidence” approaches to assessing toxic torts cases 
has been debated by both courts and commentators.  See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty 
Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011); Mnookin, supra note 42; Michael D. Green, 
Pessimism about Milward, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 41 (2013); Sheldon Krimsky, The 
Weight of Scientific Evidence in Policy and Law, 95 AM J. PUB. HEALTH S129 (2005), 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2004.044727.  
 47  Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1234-36 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 48  Id. at 1235. 
 49  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316–19 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(emphasizing on remand the significance of this criterion in assessing expert testimony); 
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1009, 1014, 1023 (2008).  See also David Sonenshein & Charles Fitzpatrick, The 
Problem of Partisan Experts and the Potential for Reform through Concurrent Evidence, 32 
REV. LITIG. 1 (2013).  
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truly rare, low incident diseases, they may be wholly implausible, and, more 
generally, because it may be possible to aggregate non-epidemiological 
evidence in a way that supports a finding of both general and specific 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence.  A lack of animal studies and 
toxicological assessments also ought not necessarily be fatal either, if other 
strong evidence (like, perhaps, well-designed epidemiological studies) 
supports causation.  The same goes for a lack of a well-specified biological 
mechanism for causation—again, if other persuasive evidence, like strong 
epidemiological support, exists, then an absence of a detailed or proven 
causal mechanism may be acceptable.  But when all of these are absent—no 
animal studies, no epidemiological evidence, no causal mechanism beyond 
the fact that one of the drugs is known to be carcinogenic—and when the 
cancer itself is largely idiopathic, then credentials, conjectures and case 
reports cannot simply be alchemically combined to produce valid scientific 
conclusions. 
It may be that a particular set of facts and circumstances could, in rare 
instances, warrant a finding of causation even without any of these traditional 
hallmarks of scientific causation—but in that case, one would want to see 
very carefully reasoned, thoughtful engagement of how and why causation 
could nonetheless be inferred in this “task at hand,” from whatever evidence 
in fact supported it.  In Wendell, however, the Ninth Circuit did not offer 
such an analysis. 
Given the absence of toxicology, epidemiology, or a clear biological 
mechanism, why did the Ninth Circuit strain so hard to overturn the summary 
judgment ruling of the district court, notwithstanding the deferential abuse 
of discretion standard?  Why did they engage in such a dramatically non-
stringent approach to Daubert and Rule 702, overturning the trial court’s 
ruling and deeming admissible expert testimony with distressingly little 
significant scientific support? 
Although they did not offer a detailed assessment of what persuaded 
them, part of the answer likely lies in the superficial plausibility of the case 
reports in this particular area, even standing alone.  HSTCL is extremely rare, 
with only a total of a few hundred reported cases worldwide since the disease 
variant was identified two decades ago.  And a number of these cases have 
in fact been reported in young men with conditions quite like Maxx’s—
indeed a 2013 aggregation of case reports found thirty-seven cases of 
HSTCL in patients with medical conditions similar to Maxx’s, and in three-
quarters of those cases, the patients had taken a pair of medicines similar to 
Maxx’s.50  Most of these cases occurred in younger men – again, like Maxx. 
 
 50  Saranya A. Selvaraj et al., Use of Case Reports and the Adverse Event Reporting 
System in Systematic Reviews: Overcoming Barriers to Assess the Link Between Crohn’s 
Disease Medications and Hepatosplenic T-Cell Lymphoma, 2:53 SYSTEMATIC REV. 1 (2013), 
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Indeed, because of the reporting of HSTCL in the adverse event reporting 
system for approved drugs, these medicines now contain warnings that alert 
physicians and patients to the possibility of an elevated risk of HSTCL.  
Given the rarity of the disease, the number of HSTCL cases diagnosed in 
patients on these kinds of drugs certainly looks like it might be more than a 
coincidence.  But as the 2013 publication asserts, the authors cannot establish 
“a causative effect other than ‘possible’” because of “the limited 
applicability of causality assessment tools for rare irreversible events.”51  
“Possible,” standing alone, is not enough to establish legal causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Although the 2013 aggregation cited above was not referenced by the 
experts, one of the experts in the case had, in fact, relied on an earlier 
published aggregation of case reports that also illustrated a substantial 
“cluster” of thirty-six cases of HSTCL in patients similar to Maxx.52  Of the 
approximately 200 cases of HSTCL reported worldwide since this variant of 
lymphoma was identified in the mid-90s, thirty-six of them are associated  
with IBD patients receiving thiopurines, and twenty of those were also 
receiving some anti-TNF therapy as well. The vast majority of those IBD 
patients diagnosed with HSTCL were, like Maxx, young and male. 
This is striking data.  For an extraordinarily rare disease of unknown 
cause, the fact that approximately twenty percent of the known instances are 
associated with both a relatively common illness and a particular family of 
drug treatments is certainly suggestive.  The authors of the 2011 article offer 
some slightly back-of-the envelope relative risks based on the data they have 
available, which suggest a substantially higher risk of HSTCL among men 
younger than thirty-five years old exposed either to thiopurines, or to both 
thiopurines and anti-TNF medications, than among IBD patients generally.53 
To infer causation from case reports is, to say the least, fraught, but the 
apparent extreme rarity of the disease overall combined with a significant 
minority of those cases being linked to treatments similar to Maxx’s was 
what led the plaintiffs’ experts to assert their belief in causation “to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability.”  As Dr. Andrei Shustov wrote in 




 51  Id.  
 52  Expert Report & Affidavit of Andrei Shustov, Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 09-
cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519380 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (citing David S. Kotlyar et al., A 
Systematic Review of Factors That Contribute to Hepatosplenic T-Cell Lymphoma in Patients 
with Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 9 CLINICAL GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY 36 
(2011), http://www.cghjournal.org/article/S1542-3565(10)00907-9/pdf).  (Note that many of 
these cases are the same cases of HSTCL as those in the other study.) 
 53  Id.  
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Given the absolute rarity of this disease generally, a cluster of 36 
cases arising in young, predominantly male patients treated for 
IBD with thiopurines and TNF antagonists stands as almost a 
signature of the disease.  While the precise mechanism by which 
these drugs used in the setting of IBD in young patients give rise 
to HSTCL is not known, it is clear that the use of these drugs, 
either individually (in the case of the thiopurines) or in 
combination, either causes or contributes to the development of 
HSTCL in certain patients.  This high incidence of an exceedingly 
rare cancer in this distinct cohort is compelling evidence of 
causation. 
 
Maxx Wendell was one of those patients.  He was a young male 
with ulcerative colitis (a form of inflammatory bowel disease) 
with a history of 5+ years of treatment with a thiopurine in 
combination with the TNF antagonists Remicade and Humira who 
developed an exceedingly rare cancer almost uniquely associated 
with this treatment regimen in this cohort.  To a reasonable degree 
of medical probability, the combination use of a thiopurine with 
TNF antagonists for the treatment of his inflammatory bowel 
disease caused, or substantially contributed, to the development of 
HSTCL to which he succumbed four months after diagnosis 
despite multiple aggressive therapies. 
 
I hold all of these opinions to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability.54 
 
Interestingly, also in 2013, Dr. Shustov wrote a blog post about 
HSTCL, for the TCLLF, the T-Cell Leukemia Lymphoma Foundation.  
There he couched his views in far less certain terms: “No specific cause of 
HSTCL has been identified so far. However, in some cases, long 
immunosuppression has been implicated. There is a suggestion that young 
people who were treated for childhood inflammatory bowel disease (such as 
ulcerative colitis and Crohn’s disease) might be at risk for developing 
HSTCL.”55 
The space between referencing “a suggestion” that treatments like 
Maxx’s “might” be implicated in causing HSTCL and asserting “compelling 
evidence of causation” to a “reasonable degree of medical probability” is 
 
 54  Expert Report & Affidavit of Andrei Shustov, Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 09-
cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519380 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014). 
 55  Andrei Shustov, Hepatosplenic T-Cell Lymphoma (HSTCL), T-CELL LEUKEMIA 
LYMPHOMA FOUND. (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.tcllfoundation.org/blog/learning-corner/le
arning-corner/hepatosplenic-t-cell-lymphoma-hstcl.  
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fairly substantial.  Obviously, these were written for different audiences, and 
perhaps it is unfair to compare the language used in these two settings to one 
another.  But it is, in any event, worth detailing why the “cluster” evidence, 
while dramatic, may not be as persuasive as it seems to Dr. Shustov (and 
perhaps to the Ninth Circuit).  First, IBD itself is extremely common—in the 
United States and Europe, the authors of the 2011 review estimate that 3.6 
million people have IBD.  Many of those—in one study, roughly forty-four 
percent—have been exposed to thiopurines, and only a tiny handful have 
gotten this rare form of cancer.  That of course does not diminish the 
suggestion that risk may be elevated with exposure, but it does make the 
existence of confounds or other causes a matter of serious question.  
Moreover, the fact that among IBD-linked cases, HSTCL seems to develop 
predominantly in young men raises questions. Might there be something 
about these men’s IBD itself, or some other genetic propensity, that caused 
their HSTCL?  It is important to recognize that these case reports could not 
exclude that possibility.  Furthermore, information from the adverse 
reporting systems for drugs is understood to be far from perfect, so the 
underlying data upon which these analysts were relying may have significant 
weaknesses.  In addition, notwithstanding Shustov’s assertion to the 
contrary—and as pointed out explicitly by the defense experts—the 
association of HSTCL with young men with IBD and a certain treatment 
regimen did not amount to a “signature.”  (Occasionally some diseases are 
so exclusively associated with a given exposure that they amount to a 
signature, like the association of asbestosis with exposure to asbestos.)  But 
recall that most known HSTCL cases are in fact idiopathic; that fact alone 
establishes that HSTCL is therefore not a signature disease for IBD plus a 
specific drug regimen.  Moreover, some HSTCL cases have occurred in non-
IBD patients after organ transplants (some of whom also had taken other 
immunosuppressants, though different ones); as well as in some patients with 
different diseases, some with no other diseases, and sometimes in women 
and in older patients. 
Finally, and critically, and as the defense experts emphasized in their 
affidavits, case reviews simply are not valid science.56  As one of the defense 
experts wrote, “While case reports may be suggestive of possible problems 
that are worthy of further study, they in and of themselves do not constitute 
proof of cause and effect relationships due to their anecdotal, potentially 
confounded, non-standardized, and totally uncontrolled nature.”57  The other 
defense expert concurs, claiming that “no reliable scientific evidence” 
 
 56  See, e.g., Expert Report & Affidavit of Robert J. Valuck, Wendell v. Johnson & 
Johnson, No. 09-cv-04124, 2013 WL 11025314 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013); Expert Report & 
Affidavit of Andrew Place, No. 09-cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519379 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014). 
 57  Id.  
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supports causation.58 
Without doubt, much about HSTCL and its causes is unknown.  What 
we have then, is a battle of the experts in a condition of genuine scientific 
uncertainty.  For the plaintiffs’ experts, the cluster of known cases and the 
association of similar drug regimens with HSTCL in patients with 
demographic similarities to Maxx is so striking, given the extreme disease 
rarity, that they are willing to name his treatment regimen as the cause of his 
cancer, even in the absence of the kinds of evidence one would typically wish 
for to make such a judgment.  By contrast, the defense experts emphasize 
that the risk assessments within these aggregated case reports amount to 
guesswork and conjecture, not science—at best, a hypothesis rather than 
proof.  From their perspective, we currently have, in fact, a complete lack of 
epidemiological investigation, assessments using thoughtful case controls, 
or any other genuine scientific basis for reaching a conclusion about 
causation or making an accurate “relative risk” judgment about this 
medication and this disease. 
If we tamp down the slightly overwrought language on both sides, it 
may be that both perspectives are at least partly right.  What we have is a 
plausible hypothesis of a causal link that has some meaningful, albeit 
imperfect and limited, evidentiary support. But we also have, as the defense 
recognized, a significant lack of the forms of scientific evidence that we 
would typically deem necessary to assert causation. 
There are, to be sure, potential public policy justifications for 
permitting cases like Maxx’s to go to a factfinder even without what we 
would generally wish for in terms of an adequate scientific foundation.  For 
rare, infrequent diseases like HSTCL, we may never have enough solid 
scientific evidence to establish cause—and this may generate a structural risk 
of under-deterrence if we insist upon solid science as a prerequisite to getting 
to trial.  Sometimes, the drugs at issue really will have caused the harm, while 
under our current rules, plaintiffs may never be able to adequately prove this 
causation with epidemiology or a strong understanding of the underlying 
mechanism, especially when the disease itself is extremely rare.  (Of course, 
the opposite danger of over-deterrence may be at least as significant. If we 
revise our tort law,59 or shift burdens of proof,60 or lower our expert evidence 
standards so that manufacturers face trial notwithstanding shaky and limited 
evidence supporting causation, valuable products may become costlier or 
 
 58  Expert Report & Affidavit of Andrew Place, No. 09-cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519379 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014). 
 59  See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New 
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997).   
 60  See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998); Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Self-Proving Causation, 99 VA. L. REV. 1811 (2013). 
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altogether kept from the market and from consumers who could benefit from 
them.) 
Legal decision-making under conditions of genuine scientific 
uncertainty thus raises challenging issues, and Wendell is a prime example.  
But we would suggest that we should face these public policy issues—and 
these questions of tort law—squarely, rather than straining our rules of 
evidence and treating expert conjecture as if it were science. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have sought to use the curious case of Wendell to 
illustrate some of the fundamental challenges associated with assessing 
causation in toxic tort cases.  Why, precisely, have we called Wendell a 
curious case?  First, because we find the Ninth Circuit opinion very hard to 
reconcile with their supposedly deferential standard of review.  The district 
court was almost certainly well within its discretion to exclude the proffered 
expert testimony and the circuit court applied, it would seem, some level of 
heightened scrutiny to reverse that decision.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit 
offered no substantive explanation for its disagreement with the lower court, 
outside of its excessive–and curious–deference to the experts’ clinical 
credentials.  We think this credential-centric approach to the assessment of 
expert evidence is not merely curious, but mistaken as both a matter of 
science and as a matter of law. 
It is critical to recognize, however, that Wendell is not curious in the 
sense that the challenges it poses are unique or unusual: assessing whether 
legally sufficient evidence supports causation is required in every toxic torts 
case.  Today, nearly 25 years after Daubert, courts still struggle with the task; 
hence, we believe, this exploration of Wendell offers valuable lessons that 
go well beyond the case.  Wendell is also not curious in representing–albeit 
in extreme form–the difficulty of drawing categorical distinctions between 
admissibility and exclusion in causation contexts in which little research is 
available.  Especially when the scientific record is thin, the fine line between 
legitimate inference from incomplete evidence, and inappropriate 
speculation and conjecture, becomes both absolutely critical and particularly 
challenging to navigate.  Because many of the dynamics present in Wendell 
are not uncommon, it is worth concluding with a few brief points about the 
case and how, in our view, it should have been resolved. 
 
(1) First, we strongly believe that if “abuse of discretion” is indeed 
the appropriate standard of review, as G.E. v. Joiner clearly 
stated, then the trial court’s determination ought not to have 
been overturned.  We recognize that the cluster of case reports 
is suggestive of the possibility of a causal link, but it was 
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entirely reasonable for the trial judge to decide that suggestive 
though they were, they were not sufficient to support the 
plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions about causation, given the near-
total absence of more traditional scientific evidence and 
studies.  (There are, in our view, some solid arguments in favor 
of de novo review for expert claims that go beyond the 
individual case, like general causation, but this debate goes 
beyond the scope of our discussion here.  But under G.E. v. 
Joiner, we believe that the Ninth Circuit itself erred when it 
asserted that the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ 
experts constituted legal error, given both the record and the 
district court’s analysis of it.) 
 
(2) Second, even if we imagine that the Ninth Circuit had been 
determining admissibility under a de novo standard, we are 
disappointed by the reasoning of the court and its strong 
reliance on the experts’ credentials.  It is critical for judges 
assessing expert evidence under Daubert to go beyond the 
expert’s bona fides and assess the expert’s claims and whether 
they have adequate scientific or epistemic support.  Credentials 
need to be a starting point for an analysis of the admissibility 
of expert evidence, not the heart of it, and certainly not a 
justification for a qualified expert to offer opinions 
insufficiently based on reliable methods and knowledge. 
 
(3) That said, if we imagine that they had been analyzing the case 
under a de novo standard, we believe that the Ninth Circuit 
could have legitimately ruled in favor of the admissibility of 
the plaintiffs’ evidence.  To do so should have necessitated a 
careful, critical look at the disease cluster evidence, and a 
thoughtful engagement of why, given the extraordinary rarity 
of the disease and the substantial fraction of cases apparently 
associated with drug regimens much like Maxx’s, an inference 
of causation, while far from certain, arguably could meet the 
preponderance standard.  Such an argument might also usefully 
engage in careful thinking about what the legal system should 
do when the evidence we would like to have may well never 
exist.  Should we think about expert evidence differently when 
the epidemiological study we might wish for simply happens 
not to have been done, compared to those instances when the 
rarity of the disease at issue makes it that much harder to study?  
Should we build some kind of “necessity” or “best realistic 
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evidence” standard into the evidence rules, and if so, how ought 
it to be operationalized?61 
 
(4) Our analysis suggests that in assessing courts’ actions under 
Daubert, it is both the conclusion and the reasoning that 
matters.  If the trial court had deemed the plaintiffs’ experts’ 
testimony admissible on the grounds that the experts were 
adequately credentialed, that would, in our view, be an abuse 
of discretion. If, however, the trial court deemed the plaintiffs’ 
experts’ testimony admissible on the basis of a thoughtful 
assessment that explained why the inference of causation, 
while not overwhelming, was adequate given the task at hand 
and the facts available, the same conclusion would not be an 
abuse of discretion.  We do not think that appellate courts need 
any form of “mixed” standard of review to make and apply this 
distinction appropriately; the simple point is that in assessing 
whether the district court exercised its discretion in a 
reasonable way, the reasons given and the quality of the 
analysis matter. 
 
(5) Finally, this analysis suggests that at the district court level, 
properly assessed, either admissibility or exclusion could have 
been legitimate.  Perhaps this is surprising, or even troubling, 
given that we are talking about a scientific question of 
causation.  But it is, in fact, simply the consequence of (a) a 
heightened admissibility standard like Daubert, combined with 
(b) a flexible, multi-pronged standard-rather-than-rule 
approach to reliability, and (c) an abuse of discretion standard. 
 
Perhaps Wendell can best be seen as a case that helps to establish that 
old adage that hard cases make bad law. The appellate judges may have had 
the inchoate sense that the substantial cluster of similar cases, coupled with 
the rarity of the disease, made the physicians’ claims of causation credible.  
But the opinion took two important wrong turns: first, while nominally 
applying an abuse of discretion standard, it in fact gave little discretion to the 
trial judge’s quite reasonable conclusions.  Second, the opinion placed far 
too much emphasis on the credentials of the experts, rather than carefully 
assessing the substantive basis for the causation claim. To be sure, assessing 
 
 61  This is an issue we have each wrestled with elsewhere. See David L. Faigman et al., 
How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 645, 665 (2000); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of 
Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209 (2010).   
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the merits of the relevant scientific claims is a substantially harder task than 
assessing the experts’ credentials. In dissent in Daubert, Justice Rehnquist 
worried about whether the courts were up to the task that Daubert set for 
them: “I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping 
responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert 
testimony.  But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the 
authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.” We do 
not believe that to fulfil their duties under Daubert, judges assessing 
causation must become full-fledged amateur scientists. But we do believe 
that they absolutely must delve into the substance of the scientific evidence.  
They need to avoid arguments based on shortcuts like a near-exclusive focus 
oncredentials and must instead ground their conclusions upon careful, case-
specific assessment of the adequacy of the scientific and empirical evidence.  
We grant, as Justice Rehnquist intimated, that this is no easy task, but we 
have every confidence that the judiciary has not only the obligation but the 
ability to do so. 
 
